I revisit the relationship between growth and volatility in two di¤erent disaggregated data sets. I con…rm that growth and volatility are negatively related across countries, but show that across sectors, the relation is the opposite. This phenomenon, sometimes called "Simpson's fallacy", has a natural interpretation in the present context: it is the component of aggregate volatility that is common across sectors which correlates negatively with aggregate growth. Furthermore, while investment and volatility are unrelated in the aggregate, sectoral investment is shown to be more intense in volatile activities, as if the return to capital were higher there. These results call for a distinction between macroeconomic and sectoral volatilities, not unlike that between macroeconomics, where volatility is often understood as policy-driven instability, and …nance, where volatility re ‡ects risk, and thus commands high returns.
Introduction
The nature of the link between macroeconomic growth and volatility has long been the focus of intense scrutiny. Since Lucas's (1988) conclusion that understanding the mechanics of growth holds more promise than understanding business cycles, many authors have sought to question the dichotomy between high and low frequency macroeconomic developments implicit in Lucas's prescription. New growth theories have been developed that endogenize long-run capital deepening and technology adoption. For instance, growth could be a¤ected by business cycle volatility: negatively if investment is irreversible or if …rms must commit to their technology in advance, but positively in the presence of precautionary saving or if high returns technologies also entail high risks. 1 In an in ‡uential recent contribution, Ramey and Ramey (1995) present evidence that countries with highly volatile Gross Domestic Product grow (conditionally) at a lower rate, particularly so in a reduced sample of OECD countries. 2 They also show this negative correlation is not accounted for by lower investment rates in volatile countries, and conclude the negative link between (aggregate) growth and volatility works through low technology adoption in a volatile environment.
In this paper, I present a simple argument whereby the relationship between growth and volatility can depend on the level of aggregation. In particular, I show under what conditions output growth and volatility can correlate negatively in the aggregate, yet positively across sectors. The intuition is straightforward. Assume volatile sectors grow faster, and consider two countries, one having faster growing, and therefore more volatile sectors than the other.
Aggregation will show the former country to grow faster than the latter. However, the ranking over volatilities may be reversed if sectors happen to be more correlated in the low growth than in the high growth countries. Therefore, the volatility-growth relationship can be reversed in the aggregate.
There are several further reasons why an approach based on disaggregated data is promising to assess the growth-volatility relationship. Firstly, theories could be dominant 1 at the sectoral level, and yet appear irrelevant in the aggregate. For instance, investment allocation across sectors could be explained by di¤erentials in sectoral volatility, without any observable e¤ects of volatility in the aggregate. The strong relationship between domestic aggregate investment and savings rates, notoriously …rst documented in Feldstein and Horioka (1980) , squares well with this possibility, while nothing prevents the available investment pool being allocated across sectors according to volatility-based theories. Similarly, there is increasing empirical evidence that a large share of productivity growth originates in the reallocation of factors within narrowly de…ned sectors. 3 This suggests that the mechanics of technology adoption -and whether they relate to volatility-are best examined at the disaggregated level. Secondly, international sectoral data o¤ers a large cross-sectional dimension, quite usefully when estimating the determinants of output growth, an exercise famously sensitive to the conditioning set. A disaggregated approach is liable to increase the precision of the estimates. In particular, the higher dimensionality of the data relative to cross-country studies, and the fact that the variation of interest is country-sector speci…c opens the possibility to account for all country-and sector-speci…c determinants of growth, both in a pure cross-section and using panel techniques. Thirdly, estimations can be performed both at the country and sector level in the same data, since sectoral data can readily be aggregated to the country level.
I investigate the e¤ect of aggregation on the growth-volatility relationship within two international sectoral datasets: one covering manufacturing activities at the three-digit level in 47 countries, the other covering all economic activities at the one-digit level in 17 countries. The former data is used to show how growth and volatility correlate (conditionally) positively at the sectoral level. The positive correlation is signi…cant statistically and sizeable economically, particularly in a reduced sample of OECD countries. Once synthetic aggregates are computed from the same dataset, the well-known negative correlation between aggregate growth and aggregate volatility is con…rmed. This is known as "Simpson's fallacy", whereby panels with two cross-sectional dimensions can yield opposite results depending on which dimension is used in the estimation. I use a Random Coe¢cient estimator to con…rm this is indeed a good representation of the data. Finally, in contrast with the aggregate evidence, I show that there is a signi…cantly positive relationship between sectoral investment rates and sectoral volatility, which suggests volatile sectors grow fast because 3 See for instance Ahn (2001) or Caballero and Hammour (2000) for a recent survey. 2 they command high investment rates. The second dataset, more exhaustive in its coverage of sectors, but coarser, is used as a robustness check. This paper is related to the endogenous growth literature. It is also related, albeit less closely, to the branch of the business cycle literature concerned with the long-run e¤ects of temporary shocks. For instance, recessions are often argued to have positive long-run e¤ects on growth, through "opportunity costs" e¤ects, whereby productivity-enhancing activities are best left for recessionary periods, or "cleansing" e¤ects, whereby recessions eliminate less productive units, thus increasing average productivity. 4 However, these theories make no prediction for the relationship between growth and volatility. Testing them empirically has involved tracking the time series e¤ects on productivity of appropriately identi…ed temporary shocks. 5 But even in a world where recessions have long-run virtues, business cycle volatility will not necessarily display any relationship at all with long-run growth, since presumably, by symmetry, the models imply that booms are "wasteful". Bad times may have virtues, but the empirical question addressed in this paper is not directly related to this possibility.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes the e¤ects of aggregation on growth and volatility in a simple two-country two-sector economy. Section 3 presents the disaggregated results in manufacturing sectors only, and, using panel techniques, establishes that sectoral growth and volatility are positively related. It also investigates the relationship between sectoral investment and volatility. Section 4 uses the same dataset to con…rm that growth and volatility across countries are negatively related. I then implement an estimation method able to directly isolate the estimates implied by cross-country as opposed to cross-sector variation. Section 5 shows the main results hold as well in a slightly coarser dataset, with information on all sectors that compose GDP and not only manufactures.
Section 6 veri…es that none of the results are driven by an endogeneity bias, showing that the same discrepancy obtains if the measure of volatility is computed using innovations in growth rates . Section 7 concludes.
The model seeks to establish under what conditions aggregation can reverse the measured link between growth and volatility. To investigate this possibility, assume the link is positive at the sectoral level, with°J i = ® +¯¾ J i and¯> 0 for i = 1; 2 and J = A; B. 6 Suppose without loss of generality that
Therefore, a necessary condition for the aggregate link to be negative, i.e. for
where ½ J 12 denotes the correlation coe¢cient between growth rates in sectors 1 and 2 in country J. The intuition in (1) is straightforward. Under the null hypothesis that sectoral growth and volatility are positively related, if country A grows faster than B, then a weighted average of sectoral volatilities in A is larger than in B. The only way to reverse the ranking of aggregate volatilities is if sectoral growth rates are su¢ciently more synchronized in B than in A, since this will add to aggregate volatility. Condition (1) formalizes this intuition. These results are easily derived in a model with N sectors, with condition (1) generalizing into
Condition (1') suggests aggregate volatility has two components, with opposite relationships with growth: a weighted average of sectoral volatilities, and a covariance term.
The latter captures shocks which tend to a¤ect similarly all sectors in the economy, that can be labelled "macroeconomic" in nature. When these shocks are particularly prevalent, ½ J ik À 0 and the discrepancy, captured in (1'), between aggregate volatility and a weighted average of sectoral volatilities is large. Actually, Ramey and Ramey (1995) show how a (time-varying) measure of volatility as instrumented by government spending does relate negatively with aggregate growth. Arguably, government spending shocks tend to a¤ect all sectors simultaneously. 7 In short, condition (1') explicits the possibility that sectoral growth and volatility correlate positively, while the reverse holds true between countries because aggregate volatility includes both sector-speci…c and aggregate shocks. 8 Furthermore, the existing macroeconomic evidence may have de facto excluded the component of aggregate volatility that correlates positively with growth, by focusing on macroeconomic instruments for aggregate volatility.
Sectoral Volatility and Growth
This section focuses on the sectoral evidence. The data used is …rst described, then crosssectional and dynamic panel estimators are implemented. Finally, the importance of sectoral investment rates is documented.
Data
I use yearly data on sectoral value added, employment and factor content in manufacturing activities, as published by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Although observations go from 1963 to 1996, the data is incomplete in the early and latest part of the sample. 9 .In order to limit the number of missing observations, I focus 7 Fatas and Mihow (2002) con…rm this fact, showing that it is the component of aggregate volatility predicted by government spending that tends to correlate negatively with aggregate growth. 8 Condition (1') also suggests an immediate way of correcting for the "macroeconomic" component of aggregate volatility, provided sectoral data are available. Unfortunately as will become clearer, in the data things are not that simple since the true sectoral relationship holds with country and sector-e¤ects, say°J i =°i +´J +¯¾ J i . These …xed e¤ects complicate substantially the derivation of condition (1') , to an extent that makes the "macroeconomic" component of aggregate volatility impossible to derive with any precision from the data. 9 The "System of National Accounts" was changed in 1993, which is why sectoral information comparable over time and across countries typically becomes incomplete after 1992. Table 1 presents some summary statistics. I report statistics for the cross-section of time average and time variance of sectoral output growth. In both samples, the median sectoral growth is substantially smaller than the mean, suggesting the distribution of average relative 10 See Imbs and Wacziarg (2002) for details. 11 Sectors whose de…nitions in the ISIC classi…cation system vary in the sample were also eliminated. Finally, outliers were excluded, whose inclusion only reinforced the results.
12 Or alternatively an index of industrial production when the PPI was not available. This follows Rajan and Zingales (1998). 6 growth is markedly skewed leftwards.
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On average, the variance of sectoral output is larger in the extended sample, suggesting sectoral output in manufacturing sectors is more stable in developed economies. This could be re ‡ecting at the sectoral level the well-known fact that (aggregate) volatility tends to decrease with the level of economic development. 14 The unconditional correlation between average sectoral growth and its variance over time is positive in both cases, albeit not signi…cantly.
I also use an alternative dataset gathered from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook, and based on questionnaire evidence. This data is coarser and is only reported at the one-digit aggregation level, but it covers all economic activities in 17 developed countries, classi…ed across nine sectors described in the Appendix. Because this dataset covers the whole range of economic activities, and comes from an alternative source, it provides a useful robustness check. However, it is also coarser, a restriction that this whole paper argues to be far from innocuous. Table 1 also presents some summary statistics for that alternative data. Firstly, aggregation into one-digit sectors appears to average away a substantial amount of sector-speci…c shocks, as the mean and median of sectoral volatility are much lower than in the UNIDO data. This should not be surprising as it is a simple application of the law of large numbers: manufactures as a whole display substantially less volatility than, say, Leather Products. Skewness seems also smaller in this data, at least for average sectoral growth whose mean and median are close in magnitude. Finally, the unconditional correlation between growth and volatility is very weakly negative.
Cross-Sectional Evidence
In this section, I focus on the pure cross-section in sectoral growth and volatility. In general, growth regressions are very sensitivite to conditioning variables and a substantial literature has concerned itself with the choice of appropriate control variables. Levine and Renelt (1992) , for instance, propose a list of four robust explanatory variables of aggregate GDP growth.
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Thanks to the added sectoral dimension, international disaggregated data make it possible to control for all (time invariant) country-speci…c considerations even in a crosssection, and thus do away with the sensitivity issue. Similarly, sector-speci…c e¤ects control for any systematic tendency of one sector grow fast, e.g. because of sector-speci…c innovations, and make it possible to focus on systematic deviations from an international average.
In what follows, all (time-invariant) country-and sector-speci…c characteristics are held constant, and the focus is instead on individual country-sector variation. 16 Speci…cally, consider ln y i;j;T ¡ ln y i;j;0 =¯0 +¯1 V T (ln y i;j;t ¡ ln y i;j;t¡1 ) +¯2 X i;j + " i;j (2) where i and j index industry and country, respectively, y i;j;t is sectoral value added at time t, X i;j is a vector of control variables and V T (:) is the (time) variance operator, computed over period T . 17 The coe¢cient of interest is¯1. There are numerous reasons why the residual " i;j is liable to contain both industry-and country-speci…c e¤ects, say°i and j , respectively. To list only two, suppose for instance political instability translates into both high aggregate volatility and low growth, as in Alesina et al (1992) : the residual is then negatively correlated with the regressor, through´j. Suppose instead that industryspeci…c technological progress is associated with both high sectoral volatility and growth: the residual is now positively correlated with the regressor, through°i. Accounting for these …xed-e¤ects is a serious issue in most growth regressions, especially so when it comes to identifying the signi…cance of one particular variable, such as volatility in the present case. Here however, equation (1) can be estimated simply in deviations from means as in F (ln y i;j;T ¡ ln y i;j;0 ) = ¡°0 +¯1 FV T (¢ ln y i;j;t ) +¯2 FX i;j + F" i;j
where
The country or sector …xed e¤ects are now controlled for, as°0 = ¡¯0
Equation (3) leaves open the question of what country-industry speci…c variables ought to be included in the set of controls, X i;j . I now turn to this question. Many authors have studied the dynamics of sectoral specialization, using insights from growth and international trade theories.
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A very stylized model may be helpful. Extend the two-country two-sector model in Section 2 to allow for two factors of production, sector 1 being capital-intensive and sector 2 labour-intensive. Suppose country A has a higher aggregate capital-labour ratio than country B. With aggregate diminishing returns to capital, country B accumulates capital faster, and factor price equalization favours growth in sector 1 there. Similarly, factor price equalization and neo-classical convergence suggest sector 2 will grow relatively faster in country A.
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Thus, from a theoretical point of view, the determinants of relative sectoral growth are two-fold. Firstly, a variable capturing country-speci…c capital-labour growth interacted with sector-speci…c capital content. This is the approach adopted in Bernard and Jensen (2001) , which shows sectoral factor content is important in explaining higher than average sectoral output growth in a cross-section of US regions. I estimate equation (3) with such an interaction term between sectoral capital content and the aggregate growth of the capital-labour ratio. However, the measurement of this variable raises a number of issues:
although UNIDO provides information on the sectoral wage bill and sectoral value added (both nominal), the resulting labour shares tend to be quite noisy. Secondly, an assumption of constant returns to scale must be maintained if the capital share is to be inferred from the wage bill. Although the evidence suggests sectoral production functions by and large display constant returns to scale, there seems to be ample cross-sectoral variation. 21 Thus, an interaction term à la Bernard and Jensen must be taken as an approximation in the present context. The previous simple model suggests an obvious alternative. If initial sectoral specialization patterns correspond to the balance of aggregate endowments, i.e. if sector 1 is initially larger in country A and sector 2 is larger in country B, then in both countries the fastest growing sector is also the smallest initially. This occurs because of diminishing returns to capital, and suggests the inclusion of a measure of the initial relative size of a sector in the estimation of equation (3), which has the substantial advantage of being readily available.
Another, more technical reason to include an "initial condition" term in equation (3) is related to transition dynamics in the usual neo-classical sense. These are potentially important here, as they tend to result in both high and decreasing growth, and thus a growth rate with both high mean and high variance. This may result in an upward bias when estimating the relationship between growth and volatility. 22 I therefore include the initial 20 For details, see Ventura (1997) . 21 See for instance Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1996) 22 There are reasons to believe that this bias is not as important in the sectoral data as it is in the aggregate. Imbs and Wacziarg (2002) show that the notion of a "steady state economic structure", to which growing sectoral share in value added in equation (3), and note that a negative sign could either be attributed to a "convergence" term or to comparative advantage. Table 2 presents estimations of equation (3), for both UNIDO samples and various speci…cations of X i;j . The main result that emerges is that¯1 is signi…cantly positive, particularly so in the OECD sub-sample. 23 Volatility is also important economically. In the OECD, the smallest estimate of¯1 across speci…cations is 0.338, which implies that one standard deviation of the volatility measure (measured across country-sectors) translates into an increase of around 0.85% in yearly sectoral output growth. 24 Several other comments are in order. Firstly, in line with Bernard and Jensen (2001) , capital intensive sectors are found to grow faster in economies with higher rates of capital accumulation. This suggests Hecksher-Ohlin based explanations for sectoral performance are important empirically. Indeed, we …nd a signi…cant e¤ect even though the estimations in this study are substantially more restrictive than in Bernard and Jensen: …rstly our sample is international whereas they use inter-regional US data, secondly our estimations are ran with both country and sector …xed e¤ects. 25 Secondly, Table 2 provides evidence in favour of a signi…cant "convergence" term, as measured by initial sectoral value added, either in absolute or in relative term. In both samples, initially "smaller" sectors tend to grow faster. As expected, the convergence term is more signi…cant in the extended sample, where the volatility term loses substantial signi…cance once initial conditions are controlled for (although not below the standard 10% signi…cance level). This con…rms the importance of "transitional dynamics" in explaining why growth relates positively to volatility. In the reduced sample however, volatility remains positive at the 1% signi…cance level in all cases. In short, the relationship between growth and volatility appears to be biased upwards by transitional dynamics, but it remains signi…cantly positive between OECD countries, where another explanation is therefore called economies would converge is not supported in the data. Countries are shown to …rst diversify, thus allocating resources across sectors increasingly equally, but start re-specializing once they reach a relatively high level of income per capita. 23 From the point of view of the positive bias that could arise from transitional dynamics, it is reassuring that estimates of¯1 should be most positive in the sample where this putative bias is a priori least prevalent, i.e. in the OECD. 24 In the extended sample, the e¤ect is smaller, around a third of a percentage point (to be precise, 0.32 using the smallest estimate of¯of 0.066). 25 Bernard and Jensen focus on the U.S economy, and show sectoral growth is lowest in least capital-and skill-intensive industries.
for. Finally, the last speci…cation in Table 2 controls for the degree of skewness in sectoral growth rates, based on the evidence in Table 1 that sectoral growth rates tend to be skewed leftwards. Skewness could potentially a¤ect the growth-volatility relationship, and estimates in Table 2 suggest it does indeed a¤ect sectoral growth rates, but not to an extent altering the positive signi…cance of¯1, at least in the OECD sample. The next section generalizes the estimation procedure introducing a panel dimension in the data.
Dynamic Panel Evidence
In this section, I implement some recent developments in panel techniques to estimate growth equations. 26 A generalized speci…cation of equation (2) is ln y i;j;T =¯1 V T (¢ ln y i;j;t ) + (¯2 + 1) ln y i;j;T¡1 +¯3 COMPADV T°i +´j + (± T ) + " i;j;T (4)
The main di¤erence with equation (3) is the partition of the data into T sub-periods. The conditioning set includes initial sectoral value added and an interaction term between initial sectoral capital content and aggregate capital growth over the subperiod [T ¡ 1; T ], labeled COMPADV . 27 ± T denotes a period-speci…c dummy variable.
An obvious procedure to estimate¯1 involves estimating equation (4) in deviations from country and sector means. However, a well-known problem with this approach is that, while it controls for the presence of a time-invariant component in the residuals, it leaves open the possibility that the lagged dependent variable be correlated with the residuals, possibly biasing the estimates of¯2 and¯1. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest to instrument the lagged dependent variable with its lagged values.
Crucially, this technique requires zero serial correlation in the residuals for the instruments to be consistent. We next present the results of two estimations of equation (4), …rstly using simple within-group OLS and secondly using its lagged value to instrument for the lagged dependent variable. Table 3 presents the results of the two dynamic panel speci…cations, with and without initial conditions. The generality of (4) is appealing, but measurement error is likely to be important because variances are now computed on fewer observations, and measurement error will be exacerbated by …rst-di¤erencing. As data quality tends to increase with aggregate income level, measurement error is likely to be strongest in the extended sample.
In other words, within-groups estimation of equation (3) may give estimates of¯1 and¯2 that are biased downward. In this light, the results in Table 3 are remarkably robust.
The top panel presents the results of the estimation of equation (4) in …xed e¤ects over two sub-periods, where ln y i;j;T and V T (¢ ln y i;j;t ) are computed over [1970, 1981] and [1982, 1992] , respectively, and initial variables are measured in 1970 and 1982. 28 First and foremost,¯1 is non-negative in all cases, and signi…cantly positive in the OECD sub-sample.
In both samples, the convergence e¤ect is strong, with very negative estimates of¯2. As expected, transitional dynamics as proxied by¯2 are both more signi…cant and larger in magnitude in the extended sample. Secondly, the comparative advantage variable is still signi…cantly positive in the extended sample, yet no di¤erent from zero in the OECD sample.
We conclude that the relationship between growth and volatility remains positive at the sectoral level even in a dynamic context.
However, estimates of¯2 may be biased, due to the lagged dependent variable in equation (4). The lower panel in Table 3 partitions the data into four sub-periods, and compares standard …xed-e¤ect estimation over these periods with an Intrumental Variables estimator using its lagged value to instrument for the lagged dependent variable. Several comments are in order. Firstly, the IV estimator has little impact on the estimates for¯1, which remain signi…cantly positive in the OECD sample, and non-negative in the extended one.
Secondly, the comparative advantage term becomes signi…cantly positive in the OECD sample. Thirdly, the coe¢cient on initial conditions changes in magnitude and signi…cance, a result that con…rms the possibility that having a lagged dependent variable on the righthand side raises some endogeneity issues, but which illustrates that the bulk of this bias falls on the coe¢cient on the lagged dependent variable itself. 29
Since second-order serial correlation in the residuals of equation (4) casts doubt on the validity of using lagged variables as instruments, we run standard (unreported) serial correlation tests. These show it is a serious problem in the extended sample, where the 28 The number of observations is lower than in Table 2 because of countries missing observations in 1982. 29 For example, Judson and Owen (1996) simulate that with 5 time periods, the bias in the lagged dependent variable is over 50 percent, whereas the bias in the other coe¢cients is only about 3 percent. hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected in both speci…cations.
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In the reduced sample, however, it is much harder to reject the hypothesis. 31 We conclude the results implied by the IV estimator are probably well-speci…ed within the OECD sample, although we notice that the coe¢cient on volatility is non-negative in both samples. Finally, including a term correcting for the skewness of growth rates never a¤ects the growth-volatility relationship, although it appears to matter a good deal in explaining sectoral growth rates.
The Role of Investment
Several theories imply that growth and volatility are related via the intensity of investment. Ramey and Ramey (1995) rejected that hypothesis in the aggregate. In particular, they show that (i) conditioning growth regressions on investment does not a¤ect the coe¢cient on volatility, and that (ii) investment intensity is not related with volatility. However, these results do not necessarily carry through at the sectoral level. It is indeed possible that, while the aggregate pool of available investment does not respond to volatility, its allocation across sectors does. In this section, I investigate this possibility.
In Table 4 , I reproduce the estimations in Ramey and Ramey (1995) , at the disaggregated level. Panel A repeats the cross-sectional and dynamic estimations described earlier in this section, but adding investment intensity in the set of independent variables. Investment intensity is measured by the average ratio of sectoral investment to sectoral value added, both expressed in nominal terms.
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The table reports the coe¢cients on volatility under a variety of di¤erent speci…cations. Of special interest is the question whether the inclusion of an investment term a¤ect in any substantial way the coe¢cient on volatility, as it would if volatility a¤ected growth via the investment rate. The results for the extended sample are not particularly interesting, as the coe¢cient on volatility was not systematically signi…cantly positive to start with, in Tables 2 and 3 . Typically, including investment intensity does not change that fact. The results in the reduced OECD sample are much more interesting. Across all estimation methods, controlling for investment substantially 30 The test-statistics are N(0; 1) = 3:88 and 2:62 depending whether the comparative advantage variable is included. This rejects the null at 1% con…dence level. See Arellano and Bond (1991) There is an important reason to include a measure of the skewness in sectoral growth rates in Table 4 . Growth, volatility and investment could move in unison at the sectoral level simply because of lumpiness in investment, that tends to be averaged away in the aggregate. In particular, a sector growing fast through capital accumulation would display high investment rates, as well as highly volatile growth rates as soon as sectoral investment is lumpy. However, this would also translate in highly skewed sectoral output growth rates, as they would tend to peak (plummet) whenever investment (disinvestment) is decided.
The fact that measures of skewness do not at all a¤ect the estimates of¯1 in Table 4 (and are often hardly signi…cant) is reassuring from that point of view.
To summarize, disaggregated data points to a signi…cantly positive link between sectoral growth and volatility. The link is weak in the full sample, but robust in the OECD sample.
Furthermore, an important channel between sectoral volatility and growth appears to be investment, as highly volatile sectors also display high investment rates. Interestingly, the positive link is strongest precisely in the sample of countries where the aggregate evidence in Ramey and Ramey (1995) or Martin and Rogers (2000) is most robustly pointing to a negative coe¢cient. The model sketched in Section 2 suggests this might be happening because OECD countries are those where "macroeconomic" shocks are the largest component of aggregate volatility. In the next section, I turn to an account of this discrepancy.
4 Why the Aggregate Link is Negative
This section seeks to reproduce the aggregate evidence on the basis of a disaggregated dataset, then proposes an explanation of the discrepancy and its relation with aggregation.
Firstly, I show the negative growth-volatility relationship holds in our data at the aggregate level. As mentioned, the fact that aggregate growth (conditionally) correlates negatively with aggregate volatility is documented in Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Martin and Rogers (2000) . The two papers di¤er somewhat in their methodology, but not fundamentally in their results. Ramey and Ramey implement a maximum likelihood estimation and focus on the variance of innovations to GDP growth, as measured by the residual of a forecasting equation for GDP growth. Thus, they take care of the putative endogeneity of output volatility, and show the negative link continues to prevail. Martin and Rogers use cross-region as well as cross-country evidence, and include a measure of sectoral shares to account for putative transitional e¤ects. Again, the aggregate link is found to be negative, particularly amongst OECD countries. Their result that a non forward-looking measure of volatility still correlates negatively with growth suggests the putative endogeneity of volatility is largely innocuous in this context. The only way for the endogeneity of volatility to generate the reversal of the evidence presented in this paper would be for the prevalence of endogeneity to change systematically with aggregation, a somewhat far-fetched theoretical possibility. To assuage somewhat this concern, the second sub-section presents results using an estimator that allows for the coe¢cient on volatility to depend on which dimension of the panel is used in the estimation, as opposed to aggregating the data. The same discrepancy obtains. Furthermore Section 6 reproduces the methodology implemented in Ramey and Ramey (1995) , and shows the same reversal of the evidence obtains even when using the volatility of innovations in output growth rates. Table 5 reports the results implied by an aggregated version of (3) and (4). In particular, I estimate
Aggregation of Sectoral Data
where country-speci…c …xed e¤ects and period dummy variables are allowed for. Admittedly, the aggregates used here di¤er somewhat from standard GDP measures, as they are sums over manufacturing activities only; the exercise remains however interesting, at least to document the e¤ects of aggregation. A di¢culty in using an aggregate of manufacturing activities is the choice of a conditioning set: the Levine-Renelt variables pertain to aggregate GDP, and thus do not belong in (5). Somewhat arbitrarily, I report results with no conditioning variables (except country e¤ects and period dummy variables), and with the Since the number of sectors per country is (arbitrarily) di¤erent because of the arbitrary truncation imposed on the data, I only report dynamic estimations, where country …xed e¤ects are held constant.
The results in Panel A of Table 5 stand in stark contrast with the disaggregated evidence.
Estimates of¯1 are now never positive, and signi…cantly negative in all but one case. As in the literature based on aggregate evidence,¯1 is particularly negative in the OECD sample, and the inclusion of standard control variables reinforces the signi…cance of the coe¢cient.
Furthermore, in contrast with the sectoral evidence, controlling for investment has but a limited impact on the magnitude and signi…cance of¯1. Panel B investigates this question in more details, presenting results where the dependent variable in (5) is now replaced with the country-average of sectoral investment rate. The purpose is to establish how investment rate and volatility correlate in the aggregate. Once again, the results stand in stark contrast with the sectoral evidence, even though the same dataset was used to run the estimations.
Aggregate volatility is never found to correlated signi…cantly with aggregate investment rate, in line with the evidence discussed in Ramey and Ramey (1995) . Figure 1 illustrates graphically the growth-volatility relationship between three countries A, B and C, sharing the same two sectors, 1 and 2. 34 On the …gure, the relationship between growth and volatility is negative between countries, yet positive between sectors. This is known more generally as "Simpson's fallacy", i.e. the possibility that, in panel datasets
Heterogenous Coe¢cients
where there are two cross-sectional dimensions, the evidence depends on which dimension 33 The next section shows the results extend to a dataset not limited to manufactures only, thus assuaging concerns about the conditioning set, as well as con…rming the generality of the phenomenon presented in this paper. 34 Canova and Marcet (1997) make a similar point, applied to cross-country growth regressions.
is used in the estimation. Note that the …gure is drawn allowing for country-or sectorspeci…c …xed e¤ects. In other words, for clarity intercepts are allowed to vary along the panel dimensions. It should be clear however that the fallacy will persist even after these intercepts are controlled for. This exempli…es the important fact that "Simpson's fallacy" cannot be taken care of through simple panel techniques, as the heterogeneity concerns the estimated coe¢cient, rather than intercepts. From the standpoint of the model described in section 2, "Simpson's fallacy" is only possible in disaggregated data if condition (1') holds. 35 I now turn to a direct test of Figure 1 .
I use an estimation method that evaluates directly the data pattern illustrated in Figure   1 . In particular, there is need for a procedure which, in the international disaggregated data, enables to choose which cross-section the estimation uses. The "random coe¢cients"
estimator introduced by Hildreth and Houck (1968) o¤ers this possibility. The estimation can be summarized as
where E(e s ) = 0, E(e s e 0 s ) = ¾ 2 I and crucially, B s = B + v s is allowed to vary randomly along the s dimension (country or sector), E(v s ) = 0 and E(v s v 0 s ) = ¡. Hildreth and Houck show the model is equivalent to
with E(´s) = 0 and E(´s´0 s ) = ¾ 2 I + X s ¡ X 0 s which can be estimated readily using Generalized Least Squares. Thus, this estimator is a generalized version of simple Random E¤ects procedure, where the whole vector of independent variables is allowed to be random, not only the intercept. In the context of a panel with two cross-sectional dimensions, it allows to choose the relevant dimension of randomness, e.g. across countries or sectors.
In what follows, I implement this procedure using disaggregated data, and run three estimations: (i) for comparison purposes, a simple random e¤ects estimation of sectoral growth on volatility, (ii) a random coe¢cients estimation allowing for randomness in¯1 across countries, and (iii) a random coe¢cients estimation allowing for randomness in¯1 across sectors. The results are reported in Table 6 , with the same choice of sub-periods as in section 3. The lagged dependent variable is no longer a problem, since the whole vector of independent variables is assumed to be random.
The …rst conclusion to draw from the upper panel in Table 6 is that Hausman tests reject a random e¤ect speci…cation, thus potentially casting doubt on the relevance of the (more general) random coe¢cient estimator. This is not necessarily problematic however.
Firstly, the Hausman procedure tests a …xed vs. random e¤ect speci…cation, while the point in this section is not to claim the data is well represented by random e¤ect estimation, but rather that the positive estimates of¯1 do not rely on the …xed e¤ect assumption. Thus, it is reassuring that estimates of¯1 in the upper panel of Table 6 remain positive and very similar in magnitude to those in Table 3 . This suggests the link between sectoral growth and volatility remains positive even if country and sector e¤ects are assumed random as opposed to time-invariant. In particular¯1 is signi…cantly positive in OECD countries, and the question the random coe¢cient estimator will answer is whether this is due to crosscountry or cross-sector variation. Secondly, it is easy to see that the Hausman test rejects random e¤ects mostly because estimates of¯2 and¯3 depart substantially from their values in Table 3 , not because of the estimated e¤ect of volatility, still signi…cantly positive and of similar order.
The second, most important, conclusion from Table 6 is that the positive estimates of prevalent in the previous estimations, there is no particular reason to expect it to be more prevalent across sectors, say, than across countries. The next section takes this reasoning one step further, by using an alternative dataset whose properties are well-known, and in particular where the aforementioned endogeneity problem has already been taken care of by other authors.
Beyond Manufacturing Sectors
In this section, I repeat some of the previous analysis using another dataset, from the UN Statistical Yearbook, with a smaller country coverage and more exhaustive, yet coarser sectoral information. This repetition is useful for several reasons. First and foremost, this data covers all economic activities, at the one-digit disaggregation level. This opens the possibility of truly decomposing aggregate GDP into its sectoral components, rather than manufacturing output. Similarly, an extensive literature is there to guide the choice of a conditioning set for growth in GDP as opposed to industrial production. Secondly, this is data where we know that the negative link in the aggregate is not due to the endogeneity of volatility to growth. Thus presumably, the reversal of this evidence at the sectoral level cannot either be ascribed to an endogeneity problem.
Before moving to the estimations results, a word of caution is in order. This dataset is more aggregated than the one used previously. Now, the whole purpose of this paper is to establish that aggregation is of special importance to the relationship between growth and volatility: it should be so as well when shifting from a three-to a one-digit level of disaggregation (as well as, admittedly, to a dataset covering more than manufacturing sectors). Suppose (three-digit) sectoral output growth is perturbed by aggregate as well as idiosyncratic shocks, say in equal proportions. Because of the law of large numbers, the contribution of sector-speci…c shocks will decrease with the level of aggregation of the data under analysis. In particular, sector-speci…c developments could be averaged away in a onedigit sectoral dataset. If, as our previous evidence suggests, the sector-speci…c component of aggregate volatility is the one correlating positively with growth, whereas the opposite holds true for its common component, the link between growth and volatility will be more negative the more aggregated the dataset.
With this in mind, consider Table 7 , which reports the results for …xed e¤ect estimations akin to those presented in section 3, both in the disaggregated original data, and in its derived aggregated version. Several comments are in order. Firstly as before, the Table   con…rms that the coe¢cient on volatility becomes negative with aggregation at the country level, with two signi…cantly negative estimates and a negative point estimates. The reversal is slightly less marked than in the three-digit UNIDO dataset: the cross-sectional estimation yields a positive coe¢cient signi…cant at the 1% level, while the result with two periods is somewhat weaker, signi…cantly positive at the 10% level only. The coe¢cient is however merely non-negative with four periods. There is however no reason to expect aggregation from the three-to the one-digit level to be without an averaging e¤ect. In the one-digit data, the sector-speci…c component of aggregate volatility is liable to have become smaller, and dominated by a common "macroeconomic" component. Nevertheless, the discrepancy between disaggregated and cross-country estimates remains substantial, and thus ensures that the reversal of the evidence on growth and volatility with aggregation is not speci…c to manufacturing sectors.
Residual Volatility and Growth
While it is unclear how this could a¤ect the discrepancy between estimates based on aggregated vs. disaggregated data, the relationship between growth and volatility is likely to su¤er from an endogeneity bias. The reason for this is the possibility that volatility be high whenever growth happens to be high. 37 Furthermore, the previous measures of growth volatility embedded by construction potential determinants of output growth, thus potentially creating a bias in the estimates of¯1. 38 One way to alleviate these concerns is to use the volatility of the residual of a growth equation instead, i.e. to follow Ramey and Ramey (1995) in estimating jointly ln y i;j;t ¡ ln y i;j;t¡1 =¯0 +¯1 ¾ 2 i;j +¯2 X i;j;t + " i;j;t (6)
The resulting estimates will not su¤er from the aforementioned endogeneity biases. However, the procedure is not parsimonious computationally, and turns out to be particularly 37 Notice however that the existing aggregate evidence then would imply that the true link is even more negative than it is found to be for example in Martin and Rogers (2001) . This makes the positive sign at the sectoral level even more surprising. 38 Once again, it is not clear how the direction of this bias could reverse itself with the aggregation level.
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intensive at the disaggregated level. For instance in the extended UNIDO sample, the required dimensionality of country-sector speci…c heteroskedasticity is equal to 47 x 28 = 1316.
With such dimensionality, convergence of the maximum likelihood procedure is virtually impossible, and thus results are presented only for the reduced UNIDO sample and the UN Statistical Yearbook data. This is actually not a problem, since Ramey and Ramey tend to …nd their strongest results in a similar reduced sample of OECD countries.
The results are in Table 8 . Once again, aggregation matters, since estimates of¯1 are positive in the disaggregated UNIDO dataset, irrespective of the conditioning set, and very positive when controlling for lagged sectoral output in the UN Statistical Yearbook dataset.
On the other hand, this estimation method con…rms the aggregate evidence that¯1 is negative across countries. Two observations are in order in that light. Firstly, the conditioning set is not innocuous, as in both datasets adding the Levine-Renelt control variables reverses the sign of¯1. It is remarkable that the exact same outcome obtains in Ramey and Ramey (1995) . Secondly, as mentioned, aggregated UNIDO data do not correspond to GDP, but rather to a measure akin to Industrial Production. Thus, the Levine-Renelt control variables might be inappropriate here, which might explain the weakness of the reversal in this dataset.
39
Point estimates however change signs with aggregation, even in a sample based on manufacturing sectors only. This con…rms endogeneity concerns fail to explain the reversal of the evidence documented in this paper. 40
Conclusion
This paper provides novel evidence on an old question. I con…rm the existing result that volatile countries grow slowly, but show that, at least for su¢ciently disaggregated data, 39 In particular, the coe¢cient on human capital has the wrong sign in the aggregate estimations based on UN Statistical Yearbook data. This might re ‡ect the fact that high human capital tends to be associated with expanding services, and thus shrinking manufacturing sectors. Note that panel techniques were used in the previous sections, and thus made it possible to specify country-and sector-speci…c intercepts. This tended to limit the incidence of control variables, and explains why the evidence based on the UNIDO dataset was stronger in Sections 3 and 4.
40 A related worry concerns the explanatory power of the conditioning variables, potentially di¤erent in the aggregated and disaggregated datasets. Reassuringly, however, the R 2 of equation (6) where¯1 is constrained to equal zero are similar at the two levels of aggregation. In particular, in the UNIDO data, the Levine-Renelt variables explain 23% of aggregate country growth, while lagged sectoral output, comparative advantage and …xed e¤ects explain 16% of sectoral output growth. The equivalent in the UN Statistical Yearbook data are 19% and 10%, respectively. The forecasting performance of (6) is therefore comparable at the two levels of aggregation.
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volatile activities within countries grow fast. In spite of appearances, the two results are not contradictory. They simply correspond to distinct components of aggregate volatility:
one, common across all activities in a country, is associated with low growth, and another, speci…c to each sector in a given country, is associated with fast growth. Risk and return are positively correlated, even though volatile countries experience lower growth. I also document that, although investment is unresponsive to volatility in the aggregate, volatile activities within a country typically attract high investment rates, in a way not inconsistent with well-established theories in …nance. These results cast a new light on the theoretical welfare costs of business cycles, and in particular call for a dichotomy between macroeconomic and sector-speci…c volatilities. Economic turbulences may very well signal economic opportunities. Results for estimation of (2), with country and sector fixed-effects. y i,j,t is the real value added in sector i, country j at time t. The dependent variable is ln(y i,j,1992 ) -ln (y i,j,1970 The dependent variable is sectoral value added growth in [1970, 1981] and [1982, 1992] in the upper panel (boundary dates are 1970, 1976, 1982, 1988 and 1992 for the four-period estimation). Initial values are measured in 1970 and 1981 (1970, 1976, 1982 and 1988 for the four-period estimation). Variances are computed over the corresponding sub-periods. t-statistics are reported between parentheses. The dependent variable is sectoral growth as measured by ∆(lny i,j,t ) between the relevant sub-periods (1970, 1982 and 1992 in the within-2 estimation and 1970, 1976, 1982, 1988 and 1992 in the within-4 estimation). Period dummy variables are included when meaningful. Hausman test reports the P-values associated with the hypothesis that the Random Effects model is more efficient, except when marked with *, where the null hypothesis is that the Fixed Effects model is more efficient. 
